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COMMENTARY

COMMENTS ON WILLIAM WHITFORD'S PAPER
ON THE ROLE OF THE JURY (AND THE FACT/LAW
DISTINCTION) IN THE INTERPRETATION OF
WRITTEN CONTRACTS
'JOSEPH M. PERILLO*

Bill Whitford has some valuable insights into the relatively unknown
process of deliberation in the jury room when a jury is charged with the
interpretation of a contract. Juries are charged with the power of
interpretation in what roughly may be called a dichotomy between two
kinds of jurisdictions. Courts which follow the more traditional approach
permit the jury to determine the proper interpretation of a contract only if
the judge without the aid of parol evidence deems the contract to be
ambiguous and parol evidence is then admitted to clarify the parties'
intentions. A wider role is permitted by courts that follow the Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,' approach,
which essentially allows the court to hear parol evidence to determine
whether the writing is susceptible to more than one interpretation. If the
court finds that the writing is susceptible to more than one interpretation,
and parol evidence is admitted in the hearing of the jury, the jury is
charged with determining the meaning of the writing.
Despite the simple wording of the rules I have just stated, Whitford
finds the case law on the admission of parol evidence to be confused and
rife with exceptions, qualifications, and contradictions-not much
different from the chaos John Calamari and I discussed in 1967.2 Two
years ago Eric Posner used the tools of economic analysis to examine the
area. He also found chaos and noted that the tools of economic analysis
did not dissipate the confusion because too many variables were
involved.
Whitford conclusively shows that if the rules of logic were applied,
the interpretation of a contract would be a factual question. If that logic
were followed, the jury would always be the interpreter of the contract
and would be allowed to hear all relevant evidence to aid the process of
interpretation. But much law is not the product of logic. During the
Distinguished Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968) (Traynor, C.J.).
2.
John Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence
Rule and Principles of ContractInterpretation,42 IND. L.J. 333 (1967).
3.
See Eric A. Posner, The ParolEvidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principlesof ContractualInterpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 533 (1998).
*
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Enlightenment, legal scholars and philosophers, such as Hugo Grotius and
Samuel Pufendorf, spun out theories of law based on pure logic. Their
theories had a significant impact on the law in the European Continent.
At the same time, the lawyers who practiced the common law in England
and its American colonies recognized the common law to be a human

artifact in which logic played only a subsidiary role.4

In the early days of jury trials, juries had broad autonomy to
determine questions of fact and also many of the questions that we
consider today to be questions of law.5 Why have the courts curtailed this
autonomy, thus allowing juries to interpret contracts only in exceptional

cases?

Why do we have a parol evidence rule at all?

Whitford

concentrates on the judicial fear that the jury will favor the little guy over
the big guy. Some observers, instead, favor juries for the same reason.
They cherish the idea that juries can serve as agents of redistribution,
albeit on a haphazard basis.
If we step back for a better perspective on Why we have rules
excluding parol evidence, let us remember that the parol evidence rule
(broadly understood to include the plain meaning rule) also applies to
bench trials. Therefore, the rule can not have its only foundation in the
distrust of juries.6 The deeper distrust is the distrust of witnesses.

We must remember that parties were not allowed to testify in their
own cases until the second half of the nineteenth century. The general
In a 1797 Maryland case, William Pinkney successfully argued for the
4.
appellant. Among the arguments he made, none of which would likely be made by a
lawyer today, were the following. Pinkney told the court, "[a]bsurdity is no argument
against [a rule] if it is law, nor its inconvenience." He points out the lack of the courts'
authority to rectify absurdities, stating "[a] man of plain sense would be shocked at the
absurdity of one third of the old common law, which has been since changed by acts of
parliament, or acts of assembly; yet it was law till it was altered." He then explains his
view of the philosophical foundations of law stating that "[t]he law is an artificial system,
which must not be judged of by the ordinary rules of reason. It is a technical science; any
known system is better than none. It is of importance to society that the rules of justice
should not be fluctuating; that they should be fixed, and settled, and permanent." I have
lifted this quotation from an article of mine: Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the
Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 427,
442 (2000) (emphasis in original) (citing Beane v. Middleton, 4 H. & McH. 74, 78 (Md.
1797)).
See David Millon, The Ideology of Jury Autonomy in the Early Common Law,
5.
at http://www.ssm.com (Nov. 14, 2000).
There is evidence that the distrust of juries is one of the pillars of the parol
6.
evidence rule. The parol evidence rule is not applicable in equitable actions that
traditionally were tried to the chancellor without a jury. Nonetheless, chancery had many
mathematical rules for the evaluation of evidence that minimized witness testimony. For
example, the defendant's answer was deemed evidence that had to be rebutted by two
witnesses or one witness and circumstantial evidence. But the defendant's statements in
an affirmative defense were not evidence. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA §§ 1528-30 (1 1th ed. 1873);
Denton v. M'Kenzie, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.) 289 (1792); Thornton v. Gordon, 41 Va. 719
(1844).
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thought was that a party's temptation to lie under oath was too great to be
trusted. Indeed, some regarded it as immoral to tempt parties in this way.
The same creators of the bar on party testimony-the judiciary--created
the parol evidence rule. When legislation ultimately allowed party
testimony, the courts, still suspicious of such testimony, created the
objective theory of contract that Holmes and Williston propagated so
successfully.
But other reasons for a hard parol evidence rule exist. The fear of
perjury is not its only pillar. Whitford has examined the clash between a
hard parol evidence rule and the channeling or earmarking function of
contract formalities. For example, suppose a contract states that "time is
of the essence, and we really mean it." Should one party be able to testify
that the drafting party gave oral assurance that "we will never make time
an issue?" Doubts concerning whether this would be admissible
interferes with the ability of parties to predict the outcome of their
dispute.
Whitford also brings out the disturbing fact that we have little idea of
how juries decide interpretative issues. It seems unlikely that one could
formulate an answer to the questions he raises by analyzing appellate
cases. I thought that maybe I could by following a widely used standard
form contract that contained a recognized ambiguity and then tally the
result from various jurisdictions,. I tried this approach with one such
standard form with disappointing results. Because the standard terms of
these contracts were not negotiated, little relevant parol evidence was
available to clarify the parties' intentions; thus, the issue was decided by
appellate courts as a matter of law. Not surprisingly, the jurisdictions
split on the matter.
Another line of cases may prove more fruitful. Clearly, the issue of
"foreseeability" of an event is logically a question of fact. Foreseeability
is relevant in determining whether a contract is discharged or reshaped by
a supervening event making performance impossible or frustrating its
purpose. There is a division of authority on whether the court or the jury
should decide the foreseeability of such an event. A federal court,
applying Kansas law, held that the issue is one of law.8 It then gave a
brief description of the leading Kansas case:
7. The ambiguous phrase I followed involved royalties promised in natural gas
leases based on the "market value" or "market price" of natural gas. The ambiguity stems
from the possibility of calculating the value or price either (1) at the time of capture, or (2)
at the value or price at the time a long term contract for sale of the gas was entered into.
One of many such cases discussing the split of authority is Tara Petroleum Corp. v.
Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1273 (Okla. 1981). But see Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v.
Shell Oil Co., 905 F.2d 840, 848 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding question of fact was for district
judge as trier of fact).
8. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS states that the question of excuse
for impracticability "is generally considered to be one of law rather than fact."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 261 (1981) (introductory note to Chapter 11).

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
The plaintiff argued that since, pursuant to the wartime
regulations, it became unlawful to drill an oil well on the land
covered by the mineral deed, the application of the equitable
principles of the doctrine of commercial frustration required the
court to suspend the operation of the contract and extend the
period of time for plaintiff to develop the mineral rights until a
time when the government regulations were rescinded. The
court found that the doctrine was inapplicable due to the
foreseeability of the regulatory event which caused plaintiff's
contractual bargain to be frustrated. Basically, the court found
that even though at the time the deed was executed on May 27,
1939 the war in Europe had not even begun, the plaintiff should
have had the foresight to see that the nations of Europe would
soon be engaged in war, that the United States would inevitably
be drawn into the conflict, and that the federal government
would use its regulatory powers to preserve natural resources in
such a manner as to prevent plaintiff from developing oil wells
on the land subject to his mineral deed. 9
In short, the lessee should have been gifted with omniscience or, at
least, greater foresight than was possessed by the admirals at Pearl
Harbor. It seems hard to believe that the court was making a finding of
foreseeability rather than covertly adopting a policy of refusing to unravel
contracts that had been indirectly disrupted by America's entry into
World War II. A jury focusing on whether the lessee should have
bargained in peacetime for a clause with respect to wartime regulatory
conditions affecting mineral leases would likely have found that it would
have been extremely unlikely that anyone in the position of the lessee to
have bargained for such a clause.
A contrary line of cases finds the issue of foreseeability to be a jury
question.' One of these cases involved a widespread failure of the peanut
crop." The jury found that the crop failure was unforeseeable. 12 In

This quotation does not separate the various elements, such as "foreseeability," of the
excuse.
9.
Butler Mfg. Co. v. Americold Corp., 850 F. Supp. 952, 957-58 (D. Kan. 1994)
(discussing Berline v. Waldschmidt, 159 P.2d 865 (Kan. 1945) (citation omitted)).
10. See Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 861 F.2d 650 (11 th Cir. 1988); see
also Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp. 310 N.E.2d 363 (Mass. 1974);
Hous. Auth. of Bristol v. E. Tenn. Light & Power Co. 31 S.E.2d 273 (Va. 1944); cf.
Oosten v. Hay Haulers Dairy Employees & Helper Union, 291 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1955)
(question of fact); Mitchell v. Ceazan Tires, Ltd., 153 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1944) (question of

law).
11.

See Alimenta, 861 F.2d at 652.

12.

See id. at 652, 654.
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upholding the jury finding of excusable nonperformance, the court
summarized the evidence on foreseeability as follows:
[Plaintiff] first argues that the issue of foreseeability of
crop failure should not have gone to the jury. We find that there
was sufficient evidence to submit this case to the jury. First, the
evidence demonstrated that for the twenty years preceding the
1980 crop there had been a surplusage of domestic peanuts.
Secondly, there was evidence that pre-harvest forward sales
contracts are customary in the peanut industry. This contracting
practice reflects the need to sufficiently schedule production to
comport with the capacity of peanut shelling plants ....
Thirdly, improved agronomic and irrigation methods
contributed to the industry's expectations of a continued
surplusage of peanuts. There was evidence that the shortage of
peanuts in 1980 was unprecedented and unforeseen by many if
not all experts. The unforeseeability was also demonstrated by
the effect of the drought on the peanut market prices: price of
peanuts increase often exceeded one dollar per pound. In view
of the evidence introduced during trial, it was proper for the trial
court to submit the issue of the foreseeability of the crop failure
to the jury for its determination. 3
I suspect that if a thorough review were made of cases where the
doctrine of impracticability, impossibility, or frustration was raised, one
would find that juries were more likely to accept the excuse than courts.
My intuition (which could be wrong) tells me that juries would be
reluctant to find an unexcused breach where the nonperforming party was
clearly a victim of circumstances out of its control.
My final thought is based on Wisconsin Law School's tradition of
empirical studies. Surely, someone at Wisconsin could design an
empirical study to determine if jurors determine issues of fact differently
than judges who often, by legal alchemy, transmute questions of fact into
questions of law.

13.

Id. at 653-54.
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